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In

. The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
WHITNEY PARRY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
J. H. CROSBY, as .Justice of
the Peace of Kanab Precinct,
.Kane County, State of Utah,
~GEORGE A.- SWAPP, as
Sheriff of Kane \.._County,
State of Utah, and DAVID
L. PUGH, as County Attorney of Kane County, State of .
..Utah,
Defendants and Respondent;~. ·
:·Appeal From the Sixth Judicial District Court,
Kane County, Utah.
Honorable Henry D. Hayes, Judge.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
...JOSEPH CHEZ, Attorney General,
:. DAVID L. PUGH, County Attorney, Kane County,
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In

The Supreme {gourt
of the

State of Utah
WHITNEY

PARRY
' Appellant,
Plaintiff and

vs.
J. H. CROSBY, as Justice of
the Peace of Kanab Precinct,
Kane County, State of Utah,
GEORGE A. SWAPP, as
.Sheriff of Kane County,
State of Utah, and DAVID
L. PUGH, as County Attorney of Kane County, State of
Utah,
Defendants and Respondent3.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
By these proceedings, appellant seeks to restrain three public officials of Kane County from
enforcing our laws relating to slot machines. The
controversy grew out of the following facts:
The Sheriff of Kane County, Utah, seized four
slot machines at what is. known as the Parry Lodge
in the town of Kanab. He took possession of the
macbtines and delivered them to the respondent,
1
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Ju::;.tice of the .feace. 'l'he Justice issued a citation
order, which was s.erved upon the appellant, directing 'him to appear at a certain time and p1ace and
show cause why the machines should not be destroyed. Before the tirne set for hearing: the citation order, appellant appeared at the District Court
of _i_{ane ·County and secured a temporary restraining order, which was. ::;erved upon the respondents,
directing them to appear at a time fixed to show
cause why the temporary order should not be made
permanent. A hearing wlas had in the District
Court, a~d after the matter had been submitted, the
District Judge refused to make the restraining
order permanent, and this appeal is takP.n to I·everse the District CourL
In his complaint for a re::;training order, appellant alleges that the respondents as public offieials,
without due process, or any process whatsoever,
took from his possession four deviees, containing
more than $600. In its findings, the District Court
found that these four devices were slot machines,
one being a five cent machine, one a ten cent
machine, one a twenty-five cent machine and one
a fifty cent machine. (Ah. 12).
Before taking possession of tlw~e machines.
the Sheriff signed an affidavit before the Justice
of the Peace to the effect that, "he has reason to
believe and does believe that the said \Yhitney
Parry, has in his place of business, certain ~SlOt
1nachines, which are being operated contra.ry to
law." The Justice of the Peace thereupon issued
what is described as a writ of attachment, whereby
he commanded the Sheriff or Constable to attach,
save and keep any and all slot machines which m~y
be found at appellan:1Ps place oi business. The
evidence is not clear as to whether or not the affidavit above mentioned, or the writ of attachment
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3
were served upon the appellant, but for the reasons
as hereinafter stated, we feel that it is immaterial
whether or not these instruments were served on
appellant or even executed or filed.

On Page 7 of appellant's brief he states his
contention in the following words :
"\Vas the proceeding in the Justice's
Court sufficient to give that court jurisdiction to seize or to order destruction of
the sO-Called slot machines and the forfeiture of the money contained in them to
Kane County1''
He claims that the proceeding'S prelinrinary to
the taking of said machines were in personam and
not in rem.
It is true that the affidavit and writ of attachment above mentioned were entitled, "The State of
Utah, Plaintiff v. Whitney Parry, Defendant.''
Appellant contends that it should have been entitled, ''State of Utah, Plaintiff, v. Four Slot
Machines, Defendant." It will be noted also that
the writ of :attachment did not direct the arrest of
Whitney Parry, but ordered the Sh rriff to attach
the slot machines. (Ab. 11). Aft~·r taking th~
machines, the Sheriff made his return E;tating in
effect that he had taken the four slot 1nachines., and
was holding them to be disposed of by order of the
C'll~rt. (Ab. 12). The citation issued by the Justice,
and served upon Mr. Parry directs that he appear
and show cause why the slot machines should not
be destroyed. It is our contention, as hereinafter
set out, that it was not necessary in order to lf1wfully take possession of these slot machines for the
8heriff to make an affidavit or to ~et a writ of
attachment, and it is there~ore immaterial whethPr
such proceedings· he in personam or in rem, or at all.
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However, if the court should feel that such proceedings are necessary and that they should be
in rem, then we submit that the proceedings
adopted by the respondents were in rem. Surely,
they were not in personam. The affidavit signed
by the Sheriff simply s,tated that he had reason to
believe and did believe that four slot machines were
being operated at the Lodge contrary to law. Nobody was accused of any criminal act. The writ did
not demand the arrest of anybody, but ordered that
the machines be taken. rrhe nature of pleadings is
determined largely by the relief sought, and in
construing a pleading as to whether or not it is in
rem or in personam, the court should be guided by
the purpose sought to be accomplished, which in the
instant case was to take possession of the machines
and to destroy them. It will be seen, therefore,
that the said proceedings were in effect an action
to seize and destroy gambling devices.
We call the Court's attention to
Section 103-25-1, Revised Statutes of Utah,

1933,
which among other things relates to slot machines,
and insofar as material here, provides that:
". . . It shall be the duty of all sheriffs~
constables, police and other peace officers
whenever it shall come to the knowledge of
such officer that any person has in his possession any cards, tables, checks, balls,
wheels, slot machines. or gambling devices
of any nature or kind whatsoever- used or
kept for the purpose of playing for money,
or for tokens redeemable in money, at any
of the games mentioned in this chapter. or
that any cards, tables, checks, balls, wheels,
slot machines or gambling devices used or
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kept for the purposes aforesaid may be
found in any place, to seize and take such
cards, tables, checks, balls, wheels, slot
machines or other g-an1bling device~, and
convey the same before a magistrate of the
county in which such devices shall be
found; and it shall be the duty of such
mag·istrate to inquire of such "·itncsses
as he shall summon or as may appear befor~ him in that behalf touching the nature
of such gambling devices, and, if such
magistrate shall determine that the same
are used or kept for the purpose of being
used at any game or games of chance described in this chapter, it shall be his duty
to destroy the same.''
Section 103-25-6 of the same Chapter provides that:
"Every prosecuting attorney, sheriff~ constable and police officer must inform
against and diligently• prosecute persons
whom they have reasonable cause to believe to be offenders against the provisions
of this chapter, and every such officer refusing or neg-lecting so to do is guilty of
a misdemeanor.''
Section 103-25-7 of the same Chapter provides that:
''Every person who keeps. or operates,
either as owner~ agent or employee, or
allows to be kept, used, operated or conducted, in his place of business or elsewhere the device or instrument commonly
known as a 'slot machine,' or any other
Rimilar device or instrument for gamblingSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

or exhibiting bawdy pictures is guilty of
a misdemeanor.''
It will be seen that Section 103-25-1 above
quoted prescribes the procedure relating to the
seizure and destruction of slot machines. It will
also be noted that no court proceedings are necessary before a Sheriff is authorized to seize a slot
machine, if it comes to his knowledge that any person has in his possession a slot machine used or
kept for the purpose of playing for money or tokens
redeemable in money. It is the duty of such officer to seize the same, and take it before the Justice
of the Peace. It is the duty, then, of the Justice
of the Peace as outlined in the statute above quoted
to make inquiry of such witnesses as he may summon, or as may appear before him, and if he finds
that the slot machine is used or kept for the purpose of being used at any game of chance as de~cribed in this Chapter, it then becomes his duty
to destroy the same.
In the instant case,. the appellant claims to be
the owner of the slot machines in question and was
given notice, to appear at a time and place and show
cause why the machines should not be destroyed.
In view of the statute above quoted, it will be seen
that it was not necessary for the Sheriff to go before a Justice of the Peace and make an affidavit
and procure a writ of attachment before seizing
these gambling devices. It was necessary, however, that the Justice o£ the Peace before destroying the machines have a hearing to determine
whether they were used for gambling purposes, or
kept for such use. If the procedure outlined in
Section 103-25-1, supra, is constitutional, then,
there is nothing, as we view it, to appellant's contention that the machines were taken without due
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
procP88, because the record clearly shows that these
public officials co1nplied with said section.
In reading the cases hereinafter cited and referred to, the Court will see that statutes of this
nature, relating to slot machines, have been held
constitutional insofar as the due process is concerned, even when they afford no opportunity whaL
soever for a hearing as to their lawful or unlawful
use. On the other hand, our books abound with decisions upholding the right to destroy gambling devices under statutes like or similar to our Utah law.
A discussion of the question under considr:ration is
found in
Volume 24, American Jurisprudence, under
the title of ''Summary Destruction,''
at Page 436.
N"umerous cases in the footnotes are cited upholding the text. '
We also call the Court's attention to the recent case of
State of South Carolina, ex rel. John M.
Daniel, v. A. R. Kizer, et al, 81
A.L.R., Page 722.
This is one of the latest cases on the subject and
together with the annotation at Page 730 of the
Volume, seems to cover fully the question under
consideration.
\Ve also refer the Court to

24 American Jurisprudence at Page 438,
where under the heading of ''Injunctions,'' the
author says:
"Equity will not int~rfere with the police
in the enforcement of criminal statutes or
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extend its help for the purpose of aiding
one to commit a crime, and equity will refuse an injunction when the evident purpd1se '.·i,thereo.fi iS' to ;prevent·. police interference in the conduct of an unlawful business. Accordingly, owners of a gambling
device have no standing in equity to ask
for an injunction against the enforcement
of a statute providing for the seizure and
destruction of such a device. The owners
of slot machines have an adequate remedy
at law by action of claim and delivery which
will preclude injunctive relief against the
enforcement of a statute providing for the
seizure and destruction of such machines if
used as gambling devices.''
Numerous cases, are referred to in support of
the !text.
In his brief, counsel for appell~nt lays great
stress on a recent decision of this Court. In re
Utah Liquor Control Commission v. ·Wooras, 97
Utah P. 351; 93 P. (2d) 455. In this case the Commission sought to have destroyed certain property,
presumably furniture and fixtures, in a place of
.business upon the theory that the owner or proprietor had permitted liquor to be sold in violation
of our laws. The Court held that the Commission
had failed to follow the procedure as outlined by
our statute with reference to the destruction of such
property in connection with the violation of our
liquor laws, and in view of such failure held that
the property may not he destroyed. Undoubtedly,
the right to destroy such property is purely statutory and the statutory procedure must Ee substantjally c0mplied with.
In the case a.t bar, however, the respondent~
not only followed thP procerlure strictly as outlined
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for the destruction of gambling devices, but took
extra precautionary mea:sures by signin~ an affidavit before the Justice of the Peace and procuring
a writ from him, and in addition thereto fixed a
time whereby appellant could appear before the
court and show cause why the property -in question
should not be destroyed.
Furthermore, there is a vast difference between statutes relating to the destruction of property under our liquor laws and those relating to
the destruction of slot machines, and there is also
a vast difference between a gambling device such
as a slot machine and the furniture, fixtures, etc.
of a business enterprize.
The remarks of Justice Pratt in his concurring
opinion in the Wooras case seem pertinent to the
questions under consideration in this case. He
said:
"If the property seized has but one use
and that an illegal one: no one may claim
it, as no one has the property right in an
illegal thing . . . under such circumstances
the invalidity of the seizure is immaterial.
If any of the property seized in this case
is of that class, then 'it should not be returned." (P. 366, Utah Report).
In the instant case, we have a Lodge with a
tap-room in connection therewith. Thes.e four slot
machines were in the tap-room. It was stipulated
that a public official, if present, would testify that
a day or two pri·or to the seizure of these machines,
he saw them beiltg played in the regular way at the
place of busineBs of appellant. It is alleged in
the complaint that these machines were owned by
the appellant and his brother, a co-partnership, and
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that at the time of seizure they had in them a sum
in excess 1of $600.
Under such circumstances, it would seem that
something smaller than a hair must be split. to convince anyone that these machines were not used ,or
kept for the purpose of gambling. If the mach1nes
had been owned by some person not connected with
the business of the Lodge, a plausible excuse ,might
be given that the large sum of money had been
accumulating for some time until the owner of the
machines could remove it, but where the operators
of the Lodge were the owners, it is inconceivable
that they would leave such a large sum of money
in the machines if they were kept there for any
other purpose than that of gambling. The evidence
shows that a motion picture concern from California was occupying all of the rooms at the Lodge
at the time, and it is quite evident that the machines
were installed for their special benefit, thus we
can account for the large sums of money. Appellant contends that inasmuch as the Lodge was being
used entirely by these California people, it was 1n
the nature of a private home, and hence, our law
relating to the destruction of gambling devices is
not applicable. We feel, however, that the Stars of
Hollywood, when they come here, are amenable to
our laws, and also that they are entitled to the
.equal protection thereof. Furthermore. we know
of no law that exempts gambling, even in a private
home.
If for no other reason, the petition for a restraining order was rightfully denied on the
grounds that the appellant had a plain, speedy aT~d
adequate 'remedy at law. He could have raised the
is.sues before the Justice Court, and if not satisfied
with the decision, could have appealed to the DiRtrirt Court and thence, to this Court, or he could
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ha,~e

brought an action in claim and delivery as
suggested in some of the cases cited above.

In conclusion, it is our contention that:

I.
The respondents in their attempt to destroy
these slot machines complied strictly with our law
relating thereto, and that such laws are not in conflict with the constitutional provisions relating to
due process.

II.
The evidence and the natural inferences to he
drawn therefrom appear conclusive that the four
mechanical devices mentioned in appellant's complaint are four old time slot machines, sometimes
referred to as "one-arm bandits,'' and that they
were used and kept for the purpose of gambling.

m.
The injunctive relief sought should he denied
because the appellant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.
Most respectfully,

JOSEPH CHEZ, Attorney General,
DAVID L. PUGH,
County Attorney, Kane County,
S.D. HUFFAKER,
Assh;tant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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